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Abstract
The contracts we consider in this paper must solve three problems:
moral hazard, insurance and discrimination. The moral hazard prob-
lem is that of providing the agents with incentives to perform in a way
that maximizes the pro…t to the principal, when the agent’s actions
are unobservable. The insurance problem is that of minimizing the
cost of risk through risk minimization and risk sharing. The issue of
discrimination is that of paying agents with di¤erent skills su¢ciently
to participate, without overcompensating other agents. We show how
the principal may bene…t from a strategic division of the agents into
di¤erent tournaments or groups. The optimal number of groups from
the principal’s point of view is determined through a trade-o¤ between
moral hazard, insurance and discrimination issues.
1 Introduction
Tournaments are used in a number of agricultural contracts, especially live-
stock contracts. In tournaments (or relative performance) the reward to a
producer is determined by comparing his performance to the performance of
other producers. The previous papers on tournaments in agricultural con-
tracts mainly focus on the issues ofincentives (or moral hazard) and insurance
(risk sharing). Knoeber (1989) focuses on the question of why tournaments
dominate the broiler industry in the US. Goodhue (1999) and (2000) analyze
how input provision can reduce information rents in the tournament based
broiler contracts. Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999) show how limited liability of
1the processor may hinder the use of relative performance schemes. They use
this insight to explain why contracts based on relative performance standards
are dominating in some industries, while other industries are dominated by
…xed performance standards.
In this paper we focus on a simple and widely used linear cardinal tour-
nament, where the producers are compensated according to their relative
performance (see e.g. Olesen, 2001). The relative performance of a producer
is determined by comparing his performance to the average performance in
his group.
The use of tournaments has been rationalized mainly by two arguments.
Shleifer (1983) rationalizes tournaments (or more precisely yardstick com-
petition) as a way of motivating …rms to reveal private information about
production cost etc. Bogetoft (1997) extends this approach by combining
Data Envelope Analysis and tournaments. This enables him to handle more
general cost and production systems than the simple linear ones usually con-
sidered.
Holmström (1981) emphasizes the insurance problem and views tourna-
ments as a way to extract information about common risk: ”forcing produc-
ers to compete with each other is valueless if there is no common underlying
uncertainty” (p. 335). According to Holmström tournaments serve as an
insurance instrument, where common risk is shifted from the producer to
the processor. This argument is also used by Knoeber (1989) to explain the
use of tournaments in broiler contracts. Tsoulouhas and Vukina (2000) show
that tournaments have positive welfare e¤ects because they fascilitate risk
sharing. Knoeber and Thurman (1995) compute the amount of common risk
shifted from broiler producers to processors through tournaments.
The focus of this paper is on another feature of tournaments, the ability
to discriminate between producers. We show that the combination of dis-
crimination, incentives and insurance issues can explain sorting of producers
in cardinal tournaments. We also show how strategic group division can
increase the processor’s pro…t1.
Usually discrimination problems arise in adverse selection contexts, where
the processor does not know the true types of the producers (precontractual
hidden information). In this paper we analyze a di¤erent source of discrimi-
1Sorting producers in cardinal tournaments is relevant, since it improves the discrimi-
nation as we show below. In ordinal tournaments handicapping and sorting of producers
can imprve the incentives, c.f. Knoeber and Thurman (1994).
2nation problems, namely the case where the processor knows the producer’s
type but is unable to use this information directly in the contract (for rea-
sons explained below). This forces the processor to compensate all producers
according to the same rule where the payment depends on outcome only and
not on the producer’s type. The analysis of the discrimination in linear
tournaments (Section 3) would give exactly the same results in an adverse
selection context. However, the strategic division of the producers (section
4) can occur only if the processor knows the type of each producer.
Di¤erent circumstances may force the processor to compensate all pro-
ducers according to one rule independent of the type of the producers.
First, the producers may possess some bargaining power and, through
collective bargaining, force the processor to use only one contract. If the
processor is prevented from using di¤erent payment schemes to di¤erent pro-
ducers, the processor may be forced to raise the payment to all producers in
order to attract a particular type of producers. An example of this situation
is the case of the pea growers in Denmark producing for Danisco Foods. Due
to e¢ciency considerations, the …rm wants to use its limited capacity to con-
tract with the growers on the best soils. The growers, however, have blocked
the use of bonuses for growers with high soil quality through collective bar-
gaining. This enables the growers to extract information rent (Olesen, 2000).
Second, legal restrictions such as anti discrimination clauses may prevent
the processor from using all available information directly in the contract.
This may force the processor to o¤er the same payment scheme to all pro-
ducers.
Finally, transaction costs may give the processor incentives to simplify
the contracts, see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Goodhue (2000).
This paper deviates from earlier studies of tournaments in agricultural
contracts, because we assume that the producers are heterogenous in two
dimensions - skills and reservation value. Most of the previous papers on the
subject assume homogenous producers. The papers analyzing models with
heterogeneous producers (e.g. Goodhue, 2000) assume that the producers
have di¤erent skills, but that all producers have the same reservation value.
However, in many cases high-skilled producers have better opportunities out-
side the contract relationship than low-skilled producers. Therefore, we relax
the assumption that all producers have the same reservation value and al-
low high-skilled producers to have higher reservation value than low-skilled
producers.
We analyze a case where a processor contracts with two types of produc-
3ers, high-skilled producers with high reservation value and low-skilled pro-
ducer with low reservation value. In this setting, the low-skilled producers
expect to always lose a tournament to high-skilled producers and to receive a
lower payment than high-skilled producers. However, a low-skilled producer
wants to participate as long as the pro…t he receives within the tournament
exceeds his reservation value. Often one type of producers (e.g. low-skilled
producers) receive quasirent (i.e. a compensation exceeding their reservation
value) when the contract is adjusted to meet the reservation value of another
group of producers (e.g. the high-skilled producers). This paper demon-
strates how dividing the producers into groups can reduce the quasirents.
The outline of the paper is as follows: A description of our basic model is
given in Section 2, where the insurance and the moral hazard are introduced.
In Section 3, we introduce the discrimination issue and solve the processor’s
problem when all producers compete in one big group. In Section 4 we ana-
lyze how the processor prefers to divide the producers. We consider the case
of internally heterogenous groups in section 4.1, where every group includes
both high and low-skilled producer. In Section 4.2 we address the question:
how many groups does the processor prefer? In Section 4.3 we analyze the
case where the producers are divided into internally homogeneous groups, so
that high-skilled producers compete only with high-skilled producers. In Sec-
tion 5 we illustrates the …ndings in a numerical example. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a processor contracting with n producers. The processor earns
p on each unit produced. The production of producer i is given by a simple
additive function
yi = ei + si + "i + ¹ (1)
where ei is producer i’s unobservable e¤ort, si is the skill of producer i.
The output is a¤ected by two independent random variables. The random
variable ¹ » N(0;§2) is a general disturbance a¤ecting all producers, and
"i is a disturbance factor a¤ecting only producer i (idiosyncratic risk), "i is
independent identically distributed N(0;¾2).
For convenience, we assume that there are only two types of producers,
nH producers with high skills (sH) and nL producers with low skills (sL),
4where sH > sL. We assume that it is always optimal for the processor
to contract with all producers. We also assume that nL = nH = n
2, this
symmetry enables us to normalize our model with sL = ¡µ and sH = µ,
giving average skills of zero.







Furthermore, we assume that the processor is risk neutral and that the
producers are risk averse and have a utility function of the form
ui(xi;ei) = ¡exp(¡r[xi ¡ ª(ei)])
where r is the absolute risk aversion, common to all producers, and xi is the
payment to producer i.
Using the properties of the distribution of the uncertainty and the neg-
ative exponential utility function, the utility can be expressed in terms of
certainty equivalence2





The processor can observe neither the e¤ort nor the uncertainty param-
eters, i.e. e; ¹; "i. He observes the skill si, but cannot use this information
directly in the payment scheme.
The producers are compensated according to a linear tournament3 given
by
xi = t + ¯ (yi ¡ ¹ y) (2)
I.e., the producer is paid a base transfer t; common to all producers, plus a
reward-factor ¯ times the relative performance, measured by his deviation





2See for instance Holmström and Milgrom (1991) for a similar modelling approach.
3All of our results also hold for a linear yardstick contract of the form xi = t +




yj (c.f. Schleifer, 1985). Under yardstisk contracts the
intuition for group division is that a high-skilled producer will be compared to relatively
more low-skilled producers than the number of high-skilled producers if the producers are
divided into heterogenoeus groups (see Section 4.1.).
5The payment to producer i, determined by the tournament, is
xi = t + ¯ [(si ¡ s) + (ei ¡ e) + ("i ¡ ")]
where s, e, and " are de…ned in the same way as y. Note that s = 0 due
to our normalization. Note also that the tournament removes the common
risk ¹ from the payment. This enables the processor to ensure the producers
against common risk without reducing the incentives, c.f. Holmström (1982).
The certainty equivalence to producer i is









2rV ar("i ¡ ") (3)
The processor chooses the contract parameters t (base transfer) and ¯
(reward-factor) to maximize his pro…t under two constraints. The structure
of the risk in our model, imply that V ar ("i ¡ ") = ¾2 n
n¡1 since "i is i.i.d.
N(0;¾2).
The …rst constraint is that the producers must bene…t (weakly) from par-
ticipating. This is the individual rationality constraint (IR). Each producer
has an outside opportunity giving him a certainty equivalence of u(si). We
assume that u(sH) ¸ u(sL), such the processor must pay more to the high-
skilled producers to attract them. Without loss of generality4, we normalize
the measure of the reservation values such that u(sL) = ¡w and u(sH) = w.
Hence, the average reservation utility is zero.
The second constraint is that the producers choose their e¤orts to maxi-
mize their own utilities. This is the incentive compatibility constraint (IC).











CEi (ei) ¸ CEi (e
0
i) for all i;e
0 (IC)
CEi (ei;si) ¸ u(si), si 2 f sL; sHg (IR)
The IC constraint is ful…lled, when the certainty equivalence is maxi-
mized. By concavity of the certainty equivalence, the su¢cient …rst order
4The actual level of reservertion value only a¤ect the base transfer t. Hence, for our
analysis it is su¢cient to consider the relative reservation values.
5We use ¯ [
Pn







¡ ei = 0
In optimum all producers choose the same level of e¤ort ei = ¯ n¡1
n , which is
lower than the reward-factor. The reason is that the producers take account
for the fact that if a producer increases his e¤ort he also increases the mean
output in his group, to which he is being compared.
2.1 Homogeneous Producers:
The Moral Hazard E¤ect
It is useful to consider the case where all producers are identical, i.e. si = 0
and ui (si) = 0 for all i, as a benchmark case. In this case, the processor
does not impose any distortion in the producers e¤ort levels to discriminate.
Identical producers face the same incentives and provide the same e¤ort and















i.e. the base transfer must exceed the producers’ cost of providing e¤ort
plus the risk premium plus the reservation value. Substituting ui = 0, and
¯ = e n




















The objective function now re‡ects the usual moral hazard problem. To
increase the e¤ort level e the processor must expose the producers to more
risk which increases the risk premium. This optimization problem has the




1 + r¾2 n
n¡1
(4)
This is a classic result in the moral hazard literature; the processor does
not induce the …rst best level of e¤ort (e = p), because this would expose the
7producers to too much risk, see e.g. Holmström (1979). An increase in the
variance ¾2 or the absolute risk aversion r increases cost of the risk. Thus,
the processor induces a lower level of e¤ort when ¾2 or r is high. As the
number of producers increases, the risk premium decreases and the optimal
level of e¤ort increases. This is so, because the processor obtains more precise
information about the e¤ort ei since the noise from " can be eliminated more
and more (the law of large numbers).
3 Heterogeneous Producers:
The Discrimination E¤ect
After introducing the moral hazard issue, we now look at the discrimination
issue. As mentioned in the introduction, we consider situations where the
processor is restricted to use the same t and ¯ for all producers in one group,
i.e. he cannot relate the payment directly to the skills. Therefore, the pro-
cessor can only meet the IR constraint for one type of producers by altering
¯ and t for all producers.
The payment to the two types of producers di¤er due to the di¤erence in
their skills and resulting output. The IR constraint must hold for both types
of producers, i.e.
CEL (eL;sL) ¸ u(sL) and CEH (eH;sH) ¸ u(sH)
































Notice that the high skilled-agents are rewarded for their skills and that
the low-skilled agents are penalized. Notice also that both the left- and the
right-hand side of the IR constraint for the high-skilled producers are larger
than for the low-skilled producers. Thus, either of the constraints can be
binding in a given situation.
8The optimal base payment t depends on the more demanding of the two
individual rationality constraints. If the IR constraint for the low-skilled
producers is the more demanding constraint, the processor chooses














and the high-skilled producers earn quasirents. If the IR constraint for the
producers with high skills are the more demanding, the reverse is true and
the base payment is














Our model does not tell per se which of the IR constraints is the more
demanding. We therefore have three cases to consider. Case A, where the
low-skilled producers receive quasirents. Case B, where the high-skilled pro-
ducers receive quasirents. And …nally Case C, where none of the producers
receive quasirents.
3.1 Case A: quasirents to low-skilled producers
We now look at the situation where the payment exactly meets the reser-
vation value of the high-skilled producers, such that high-skilled producers
receive no quasirents. We use that ¯ = e and t = tH. We denote the level of


























sub : w ¸ µe
H n
n ¡ 1
The constraint w ¸ eHµ n
n¡1 ensures that the IR constraint for the low-skilled
producer is ful…lled. In Case A, the IR constraint is not binding for the
low-skilled producers. If the constraint binds, none of the producers receive
quasirents (Case C).
The …rst order condition6 for maximum pro…t generated by one producer
is
d¼h(e)








n ¡ 1 | {z }
discrimination e¤ect
= 0
6The second order condition is always ful…lled, since: d2¼h





p + µ n
n¡1
1 + r¾2 n
n¡1
(5)
The …rst order condition shows that the discrimination e¤ect µ n
n¡1 is
positive7. I.e. the processor induces a higher level of e¤ort in order to reduce
quasirents to the low-skilled producers. Stronger incentives means higher
penalty to low-skilled producers for low performance.
Figure 1 below illustrates the situation. The …gure displays the payment
(x) as a function of output (y). The producers are rewarded according to
their relative skills, hence the high-skilled producers are paid more for the
same level of e¤ort than the low-skilled producers. The low-skilled producers
receive a higher payment than their IR constraint require - i.e. quasirents.
H e
y Output 






























H e ß =
1
Figure 1: Quasirents to low-skilled agents
3.2 Case B: quasirent to high-skilled producers
Next, we consider the situation where the payment exactly meets the low-
skilled producers’ reservation value, i.e. they receive zero quasirents. In this
7A common feature of adverse selection models is that the principal distort the level of
e¤ort to reduce quasirents, see for example La¤ont and Tirole (1993).
10section we assume that the high-skilled producers receive positive quasirents
(we return to the situation where none of the producers receive quasirents
in Case C). We denote the level of e¤ort in this case eL. The processor




























s:t: w · µe
L n
n ¡ 1
The constraint w · µeL n
n¡1 ensures that the IR constraint is ful…lled for the
high-skilled producers. In Case B, the constraint holds with inequality, and
the maximization problem has an internal solution of
e
L =
p ¡ µ n
n¡1
1 + r¾2 n
n¡1
(6)
When the high-skilled producers receive quasirents, the processor induces
a lower level of e¤ort, i.e. the discrimination e¤ect is negative. The reason is
that reducing the incentives also reduces the bene…ts for having high skills.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 2 below. The …gure is constructed in


















L e = b
1
L e q +


















L e = b
1
L e q +
L e q -
L e
Figure 2: Quasirents to high-skilled agents
11The …gure shows that reducing the incentives decreases the quasirent to
the high-skilled producers, therefore the discrimination e¤ect decreases the
optimal level of e¤ort.
3.3 Case C: no quasirents
Whenneither Case Anor Case Bapplies, the processor eliminate all quasirents.
We refer to this as Case C. The relevant interval for Case C is
p ¡ µ n
n¡1
n¡1
n + r¾2µ · w ·
p + µ n
n¡1
n¡1
n + r¾2µ (7)




which induces perfect discrimination between the two types of producers,
such that all quasirents are eliminated. In Case C there is no freedom in
the choice of ¯ and t. The processor basically has to solve two independent




Outside the interval (7) there is imperfect discrimination and one type of
producer receive quasirents. When one type of producer receive quasirents,
the level of e¤ort determined in Case A or Case B applies. Thus, we have




















if w · µeL n
n¡1 (Case B)
(8)
Figure 3 maps the three di¤erent cases.
12s
w
H e e =
A   Case
C e e =
C   Case
L e e =    B,   Case
Figure 3: Mapping of case A, B and C.
Notice that eL < e¤ < eH, i.e. outside the interval where no producer
earns quasirents, the level of e¤ort is always distorted. In the interval where
no producer earns quasirents (Case C), the level of e¤ort may be distorted
both upwards and downwards due to the discrimination e¤ect, i.e. eC ? e¤.
4 Group Division
So far, we have considered only cases where all producers compete in one
group (tournament). However, the processor may use his knowledge about
the producers’ types to divide them into smaller groups. In particular, the
processor may reduce the quasirents if he divides the producers into more
than one group.
We assume that the level of e¤ort is in the interval where it is optimal to
discriminate perfectly between the two types of producers and eliminate all
quasirents - i.e. Case C8.
There are two distinct ways the groups can be divided. The processor can
choose to make internally heterogeneous groups where producers with high
skills are mixed with producers with low skills. The other approach is to












When there is perfect discrimination, the reward factor is ¯ = w
µ , hence the
reward (penalty) for having high skills (low skills) is independent of the group
size. However, a producer has more impact on the average performance in
his group when the group is small. This reduces the producers incentives to
provide e¤ort, thus the level of e¤ort changes according to the size of the
group. The distortion in the level of e¤ort can either increase or decrease
when the producers are divided into groups.









The di¤erence in the level of e¤ort compared to the case where all pro-



















i.e. the level of e¤ort is always lower if the producers compete in two hetero-
geneous groups than if all producers compete in one group.
The processor may gain from dividing the producers into two heteroge-
neous groups, if the e¤ort induced when all producers compete in one big
group is distorted upwards relative to e¤ (i.e. eC > e¤). On the other hand,
if the level of e¤ort is distorted downwards relative to e¤ when all producers
compete in one big group (i.e. eC < e¤), dividing the group will only make
things worse - for two reasons. First, the level of e¤ort is always lower when
the producers compete in two heterogeneous groups instead of one group, i.e.
the distortion in the level of e¤ort increases when the producers are divided
into two groups. Second, the uncertainty increases when the producers are
divided into two groups. In other words, it is relevant to divide the produc-
ers into two groups only if the level of e¤ort is distorted upwards when all
producers compete in one big group (i.e. eC > e¤).


















14When the producers compete in two heterogeneous groups, the processor












































































We therefore have the following result: the processor chooses to have the
producers competing in










There is always afractionof the interval where no producers earns quasirents
(i.e. Case C) where the processor prefers to have only one group of produc-
ers. The reason is that the lower boundary for Case C is below the point
where the processor is indi¤erent between one group and two groups9. On
the other hand the processor only divides the producers into two groups if
the di¤erence in skills (µ) is large enough10, otherwise the processor always
prefers one group in Case C.




























n¡1µ. Hence, g = n







15The higher the price p; the larger the interval of w (the di¤erence in the
reservation values) where the processor prefers that the producers compete
in one group. The reason is that e¤ort is more valuable if the price is high.
If the number of producers goes up, the interval where the processor
prefers two groups increases. The reason is that the uncertainty only in-
creases very little, when a large number of producers are divided into two
groups. Therefore, the gain from a lower distortion in the level of e¤ort can
be obtained through a small increase in the risk premium.
Another interesting result is that high variance or high risk aversion in-
creases the interval where the processor prefers two groups. When the pro-
ducers are divided into two groups, two opposite e¤ects come into play. First,
the uncertainty increases due to the law of large numbers. Second, the in-
centives weaken. The latter e¤ect dominates the …rst in the risk premium
(the incentives are raised to the second power when calculating the risk pre-
mium). When the producers compete in two heterogeneous groups instead


































This expression shows that the reduction in distortion more than outweights
the increase in uncertainty.
4.2 How Many Groups?
We have shown that the processor may bene…t from dividing the producers
into two heterogeneous groups. This reasoning can be repeated. The proces-
sor may prefer to have four heterogenous groups rather than just two groups
and so on. In this section we address the question: what is the optimal
number of groups from the processors point of view?
Let g denote the number of heterogeneous groups. The level of e¤ort in





















16Solving the …rst order condition11 and ignoring integer problems gives the
optimal number of groups







There has to be at least one group, and each group must have at least two





















The optimal number of groups is found through a trade-o¤ between moral
hazard, insurance, and discrimination issues. When the moral hazard issue
dominates due to a high price p, the processor prefers to have the producers
competing in few and larger groups. The reason is that the level of e¤ort is
higher in larger groups.
When the discrimination e¤ect dominates, the processor chooses to divide
the producers into small groups to increase the discrimination. The discrim-
ination issue is dominating when the di¤erence in the reservation value (w)
is large relative to the di¤erence in the skills (µ).
When the insurance issue dominates, the processor prefers to divide the
producers into small groups. In this way he can lower the risk premium
through weaker incentives - even though the uncertainty actually increases.
The reason is that the decrease in the incentives more than outweigh the
increase in uncertainty as described in section 3.1.
4.3 Homogeneous Groups
We now consider homogeneous groups where all high-skilled producers com-
pete in one group and all low-skilled producers compete in another group.
If the processor can pay di¤erent base payment (i.e. di¤erent t) to groups,
he can discriminate perfectly between the two types of producers without
distorting the level of e¤ort. However, there is a cost of doing so, which is






µ2 (n ¡ g) + 1
2r¾2 w2
µ2 = 0 The
second order condition for g is ful…lled since:
d2¼(g)




¢2 < 0 .
17an increase in the uncertainty since the number of producers in each group
decreases.
When the producers are divided into two internally homogeneous groups,























When the processor divides the producers into two homogeneous groups




































This expression can be positive as well as negative. In our model the
processor, under some circumstances, prefers to have all producers competing
in one big group, while under other circumstances it is preferable to have the
producers compete in one big group.
In many cases the processor can not use di¤erent base payments to dif-
ferent groups, due to legal restrictions, negotiations, etc. (c.f. the Introduc-
tion). It is less favorable to divide the producers into internally homogeneous
groups, when the processor must use the same base payment to both groups.
The reason is that the low-skilled producers always receive quasirents12, when
the producers compete in two homogeneous groups receiving the same base
payment.
When the producers compete in two internally homogeneous groups with





















When the processor is required to pay the same base payment to both groups,
his pro…t decreases by b ¼ho¡¼ho = nw. Hence, when the base payment is the
same in both groups, there are fewer instances where the processor prefers
two homogeneous groups rather than one group. However, if ¼C ¡¼ho > nw
the processor prefers two homogeneous groups rather than one big group
including all producers - even though he must pay the same base payment
to both groups.
12The quasirents to a low skilled agent equal the di¤erence in reservation value, i.e.2w.
185 Numerical Example
In this section we illustrate our results through a simple numerical example.
Consider a case with four producers. We assume that P = 1, and r¾2 = 0:3,
and w = 1.
We start by considering µ = 1. In this case the e¤ort levels are
e
H =
p + µ n
n¡1








and eL = ¡0:2381, and eC = 0:75.
The relevant level of e¤ort is eC = 0:75, since µeH n
n¡1 = 1¢1:6667¢ 4
4¡1 =
2:2223 > w, and µeL n
n¡1 = ¡0:3175 < w. The pro…t (per producer) to the
processor is
¼











Table 1 below shows the level of e¤ort and the resulting pro…t (per pro-
ducer) to the processor for µ = 1, µ = 0:75, and µ = 0:25, when the producers
compete in:
² one big group
² two heterogeneous groups
² two homogeneous groups, receiving di¤erent base payment





One group C eC = 0:75 ¼C = 0:3563
Heterogeneous groups C ehe = 0:5 ¼he = 0:3000
Homogeneous groups, di¤. t eho = 0:625 ¼ho = 0:3125
Homogeneous groups, same t eho = 0:625 b ¼ho = ¡0:6875
µ = 0:75
One group C eC = 1 ¼C = 0:3000
Heterogeneous groups C ehe = 0:6667 ¼he = 0:3111
Homogeneous groups, di¤. t eho = 0:625 ¼ho = 0:3125
Homogeneous groups, same t eho = 0:625 b ¼ho = ¡0:6875
µ = 0:25
One group A eC = 0:9524 ¼e = ¡3:3
Heterogeneous groups A ehe = 0:9375 ¼he = ¡1:2
Homogeneous groups, di¤. t eho = 0:625 ¼ho = 0:3125
Homogeneous groups, same t eho = 0:625 b ¼ho = ¡0:6875
Table 1: E¤ort and resulting pro…ts for di¤erent group divisions.
The processor prefers that the producers compete in one group, when
µ = 1. When µ = 0:75 the processor preferers to divide the producers into
two heterogeneous groups rather than having the producers compete in one
group. However, the processor can do even better by diving the producers
into homogeneous groups, if he can pay di¤ernt base payment to di¤erent
groups.
For µ = 0:25 the low-skilled producers recieve quasirents, when the pro-
ducers compete in one group (Case A). In this situation the processor prefers
to divide the producers into homogeneous groups. This holds even if the
processor cannot use di¤erent base payment to the two homogeneous groups.
Table 2 summarizes our …ndings
20Assumption Results Best division
µ = 1 ¼C > ¼ho > ¼he > b ¼ho One group
µ = 0:75 ¼ho > ¼he > ¼C > b ¼ho Two homogeneous groups
di¤erent base payment
µ = 0:25 ¼ho > b ¼ho > ¼he > ¼C Two homogeneous groups
di¤erent base payment
Table 2: Optimal group division.
When µ = 1 and µ = 0:75 the producers do not receive quasirents. When
µ = 0:25 the producers earn quasirents, if the processor can not pay di¤erent
base payment to the two homogeneous groups. In this case, the processor
divides the producers into heterogeneous groups and the low-skilled produc-
ers receive quasirents of 2w = 2. If the producers compete in one group, the
low-skilled producers would receive quasirents of 2
¡




Hence, when the processor cannot pay di¤erent base payment to di¤erent
groups, both the processor and the producers are better o¤ if group division
is allowed. Thus, it may be bene…cial for the producers to force the processor
to use the same contract to all producers, but allow the processor to divide
the producers into groups.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a model combining moral hazard, risk sharing, and dis-
crimination issues in linear tournaments. We show that the processor can
bene…t by strategic division of the producers into tournaments or groups
when the processor posses some information about the producers’ type, which
he cannot use directly in the contract.
The discrimination e¤ect causes distortion in the level of e¤ort. Consider
the case, A, when the low-skilled producers receive quasirents. In this case,
it is optimal for the processor to use stronger incentives and implement a
higher level of e¤ort. Stronger incentives reduces the quasirents to low-skilled
producers via a stronger punishment. In a di¤erent case, B, the high-skilled
producers receive quasirents. Here it is optimal for the processor to use
weaker incentives. This distorts the level of e¤ort downwards and reduces
the quasirents to the high-skilled producers, since these producers bene…t less
from having better skills. In a third case, C, where none of the producers
21receive quasirents, the discrimination e¤ect may lead to either weaker or
stronger incentives.
The processor can use the division of producers into groups strategically.
If the processor distorts the level of e¤ort upwards in case C, he may gain in
two ways from dividing the producers into more heterogeneous groups. First,
the distortion in the level of e¤ort falls, since the level of e¤ort is lower in
smaller groups. Second, the risk premium decreases due to weaker incentives.
We have shown that the processor may bene…t from dividing the produc-
ers into internally homogeneous groups (groups where high-skilled producers
compete only with other high-skilled producers etc.). The potential gain from
dividing the producers into homogeneous groups is highest if the processor
can use di¤erent base payment to di¤erent groups.
Our analysis emphasizes a controversial aspect of tournaments. A proces-
sor can use tournaments to discriminate between heterogeneous producers,
especially if he uses his authority to divide the producers into groups. The
discrimination in tournaments can increase the processor’s pro…t - but often
at the expense of the producers. This may explain why producers in many
cases resist the use of tournaments in agricultural contracts.
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